data built 2026-10-19T13:16:53Z

Look up another CVE · open CVE-2024-56591 in the interactive tracker

CVE-2024-56591

Bluetooth: hci_conn: Use disable_delayed_work_sync

8.8 EPSS 0.3% AV:A

Published 2024-12-27 (22 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/bluetooth. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2024-56591 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormvulnerable6.1.190-1No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series bookworm tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for bookworm have historically landed a median of 23 days after publication.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed6.12.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed6.12.5-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.5-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

This makes use of disable_delayed_work_sync instead cancel_delayed_work_sync as it not only cancel the ongoing work but also disables new submit which is disarable since the object holding the work is about to be freed.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c

What this is
BLUETOOTH SUBSYSTEMMAINTAINERS section matched on net/bluetooth/ · linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org · Supported
Kernel module
bluetooth

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_BT /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w bluetooth

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this, but not on every flavour. At least one release below builds the code on some of its kernel flavours and not on others, so the answer depends on the architecture and flavour installed.

  • bookwormMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64
  • trixie, forky, sidMnot built on amd64/cloud-amd64, arm64/cloud-arm64, s390x/s390x
M
a module where it is built at all; some flavours do not build it
Build switch
CONFIG_BT

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2024-12-27 (22 months ago)source
CVSS
8.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
adjacent network (AV:A)source
EPSS
0.28%, higher than 19.1% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
net/bluetooth

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
3.36.12.5c55a4c5a04ba
3.36.132b0f2fc9ed62

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:AAttack vector, adjacent network
The vulnerable teardown path lives in the Bluetooth HCI connection layer and is driven by connection setup/disconnect events from a peer device, so the attacker must be within Bluetooth radio range of the target. Per kernel scoring convention Bluetooth reachability is Adjacent.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
Although this is a race, the attacker controls both sides of it — repeatedly initiating and abruptly dropping L2CAP/LE connections drives `hci_conn_del()` on the HCI event path while concurrent channel teardown calls `hci_conn_drop()` and re-arms `disc_work`. The attempt can be retried indefinitely with no condition outside the attacker's influence.
PR:NPrivileges required, none
No privileges on the target are required: L2CAP/LE connection establishment and teardown occur before pairing or authentication, and no capability check exists anywhere on the path from packet/event handling to `hci_conn_del()`.
UI:NUser interaction, none
The entire sequence is driven by attacker-initiated link establishment and disconnection handled automatically by the kernel's HCI event processing. No action by a local user or victim is needed.
S:UScope, unchanged
The use-after-free corrupts kernel heap memory within the same kernel security authority, with no crossing of a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
The re-armed delayed work leaves an armed timer and workqueue linkage inside a freed `hci_conn` slab object, and `hci_conn_timeout()`/`hci_conn_idle()` subsequently read attacker-groomed reallocated memory. This use-after-free gives an arbitrary kernel read primitive and can leak arbitrary kernel memory.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
`queue_delayed_work()`/`cancel_delayed_work()` write into the freed object, and the pending timer's `->function` and the work's `->func` are later dereferenced out of it, so heap spraying yields a controlled write and an indirect call — sufficient for control-flow hijack and kernel privilege escalation.
A:HAvailability impact, high
Even unexploited, the use-after-free dereferences freed slab memory from timer softirq and workqueue context, producing KASAN splats, oopses, or a kernel panic, which syzbot reproduced reliably.