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CVE-2024-53168

sunrpc: fix one UAF issue caused by sunrpc kernel tcp socket

7.8 EPSS 0.3% AV:L

Published 2024-12-27 (22 months ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem net/sunrpc. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.

What to do, per Debian release

Debian's own status for CVE-2024-53168 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source

ReleaseStatus VersionWhat this means
Debian 12bookwormvulnerable6.1.190-1No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series bookworm tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for bookworm have historically landed a median of 23 days after publication.
Debian 13trixiefixed6.12.3-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.3-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian 14forkyfixed6.12.3-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.3-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.
Debian unstablesidfixed6.12.3-1Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.12.3-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts.

The vulnerability

What the bug is

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tcp_write_timer_handler+0x156/0x3e0 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888111f322cd by task swapper/0/0 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc4-dirty #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3d0 print_report+0xb4/0x270 kasan_report+0xbd/0xf0 tcp_write_timer_handler+0x156/0x3e0 tcp_write_timer+0x66/0x170 call_timer_fn+0xfb/0x1d0 __run_timers+0x3f8/0x480 run_timer_softirq+0x9b/0x100 handle_softirqs+0x153/0x390 __irq_exit_rcu+0x103/0x120 irq_exit_rcu+0xe/0x20 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0x90 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:default_idle+0xf/0x20 Code: 4c 01 c7 4c 29 c2 e9 72 ff ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 66 90 0f 00 2d 33 f8 25 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 cc cc cc cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 RSP: 0018:ffffffffa2007e28 EFLAGS: 00000242 RAX: 00000000000f3b31 RBX: 1ffffffff4400fc7 RCX: ffffffffa09c3196 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff9f00590f RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed102360835d R10: ffff88811b041aeb R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffffffa202d7c0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000000147d0 default_idle_call+0x6b/0xa0 cpuidle_idle_call+0x1af/0x1f0 do_idle+0xbc/0x130 cpu_startup_entry+0x33/0x40 rest_init+0x11f/0x210 start_kernel+0x39a/0x420 x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0x97/0xa0 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 </TASK> Allocated by task 595: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x87/0x90 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x12b/0x3f0 copy_net_ns+0x94/0x380 create_new_namespaces+0x24c/0x500 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0x75/0xf0 ksys_unshare+0x24e/0x4f0 __x64_sys_unshare+0x1f/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x70/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 100: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x54/0x70 kmem_cache_free+0x156/0x5d0 cleanup_net+0x5d3/0x670 process_one_work+0x776/0xa90 worker_thread+0x2e2/0x560 kthread+0x1a8/0x1f0 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Reproduction script: mkdir -p /mnt/nfsshare mkdir -p /mnt/nfs/netns_1 mkfs.ext4 /dev/sdb mount /dev/sdb /mnt/nfsshare systemctl restart nfs-server chmod 777 /mnt/nfsshare exportfs -i -o rw,no_root_squash *:/mnt/nfsshare ip netns add netns_1 ip link add name veth_1_peer type veth peer veth_1 ifconfig veth_1_peer 11.11.0.254 up ip link set veth_1 netns netns_1 ip netns exec netns_1 ifconfig veth_1 11.11.0.1 ip netns exec netns_1 /root/iptables -A OUTPUT -d 11.11.0.254 -p tcp \ --tcp-flags FIN FIN -j DROP (note: In my environment, a DESTROY_CLIENTID operation is always sent immediately, breaking the nfs tcp connection.) ip netns exec netns_1 timeout -s 9 300 mount -t nfs -o proto=tcp,vers=4.1 \ 11.11.0.254:/mnt/nfsshare /mnt/nfs/netns_1 ip netns del netns_1 The reason here is that the tcp socket in netns_1 (nfs side) has been shutdown and closed (done in xs_destroy), but the FIN message (with ack) is discarded, and the nfsd side keeps sending retransmission messages. As a result, when the tcp sock in netns_1 processes the received message, it sends the message (FIN message) in the sending queue, and the tcp timer is re-established. When the network namespace is deleted, the net structure accessed by tcp's timer handler function causes problems. To fix this problem, let's hold netns refcnt for the tcp kernel socket as done in other modules. This is an ugly hack which can easily be backported to earlier kernels. A proper fix which cleans up the interfaces will follow, but may not be so easy to backport.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

net/sunrpc/svcsock.c
net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c

What this is
KERNEL NFSD, SUNRPC, AND LOCKD SERVERSMAINTAINERS section matched on net/sunrpc/ · linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org · Supported
Kernel module
sunrpc

Check it on the machine

grep -w CONFIG_SUNRPC /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

lsmod | grep -w sunrpc

Prints a line if that module is loaded right now, and nothing if it is not. One that is not loaded can still be loaded later by anything that needs it.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this as a loadable module. Every release below compiles it as a module on every flavour, so whether the code is in the running kernel depends on whether that module is loaded.

  • bookworm, trixie, forky, sidm
m
a loadable module on every flavour - check lsmod, can be blacklisted
Build switch
CONFIG_SUNRPC

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published
2024-12-27 (22 months ago)source
CVSS
7.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hsource recompute it
Attack vector
local (AV:L)source
EPSS
0.25%, higher than 15.6% of all CVEssource
CISA KEV
not listedthe KEV catalogue
Debian urgency
not yet assignedsource
Subsystem
net/sunrpc

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

IntroducedFixed inCommit
4.26.6.640ca87e506375
4.26.11.11694ccb05b79e
4.26.12.261c0a5eac968
4.26.133f23f96528e8

Why the CNA scored it this way

Quoted from the kernel CNA's own scoring file, word for word. A highlighted metric carries the most severe value CVSS v3.1 defines for it, which is what pushes the score up. source

AV:LAttack vector, local
Triggering the UAF requires local operations — creating a network namespace via unshare(CLONE_NEWNET), establishing a sunrpc TCP transport in it, and destroying the namespace so cleanup_net() frees the struct net. A remote peer only controls the enabling condition (withholding the FIN ACK so the retransmit timer stays armed); it cannot initiate the namespace teardown that constitutes the free.
AC:LAttack complexity, low
The upstream reproducer is a deterministic script: the attacker controls both sides — keeping the TCP retransmit timer armed (drop the FIN, or use a peer that never ACKs) and the timing of the netns deletion. No condition depends on chance or on state the attacker cannot influence.
PR:LPrivileges required, low
The freeing half of the UAF is driven by the ordinary, unprivileged unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) syscall path shown in the KASAN allocation trace, and in containerized deployments the namespace-confined "root" that creates the netns, mounts NFS, and tears the netns down is an unprivileged principal on the host. Choosing the higher severity where privilege attribution is ambiguous, this is Low rather than High.
UI:NUser interaction, none
The entire sequence — namespace creation, RPC transport setup, blocking the FIN, and namespace deletion — is performed by the attacker's own processes. No action by a separate victim user is needed.
S:UScope, unchanged
The use-after-free corrupts kernel memory and is exploited within the kernel's own security authority; there is no crossing into a different security scope such as a hypervisor or IOMMU boundary.
C:HConfidentiality impact, high
tcp_retransmit_timer() reads sysctl fields and the net->mib percpu pointer out of the freed struct net; with the net_namespace slab object reclaimed by attacker-groomed allocations this becomes a controlled read primitive, and per guidance any use-after-free is scored High.
I:HIntegrity impact, high
__NET_INC_STATS() dereferences and increments through a percpu pointer loaded from the freed struct net, giving a write through an attacker-influenceable stale pointer; a use-after-free of a groomable slab object is exploitable for heap manipulation and control-flow hijacking.
A:HAvailability impact, high
The confirmed observable effect is a KASAN slab-use-after-free in tcp_write_timer_handler() executing in softirq/IRQ context on the idle CPU, which readily oopses or panics the machine.