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CVE-2024-42239
bpf: Fail bpf_timer_cancel when callback is being cancelled
Published 2024-08-07 (2 years ago) by the Linux kernel CNA. Subsystem kernel/bpf. Debian urgency: not yet assigned.
What to do, per Debian release
Debian's own status for CVE-2024-42239 in every release this site tracks, and what each one means in practice. Every status below is the one the Debian Security Team publishes for this CVE. source
| Release | Status | Version | What this means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian 12bookworm | vulnerable | 6.1.190-1 | No fix published anywhere yet, neither in Debian nor upstream for the series bookworm tracks. Watch the Debian tracker page for this CVE. Advisories for bookworm have historically landed a median of 23 days after publication. |
| Debian 13trixie | fixed | 6.9.10-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.9.10-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian 14forky | fixed | 6.9.10-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.9.10-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
| Debian unstablesid | fixed | 6.9.10-1 | Update the kernel and reboot. Fixed in 6.9.10-1. A running kernel keeps the old code until the machine restarts. |
The vulnerability
What the bug is
Given a schedule: timer1 cb timer2 cb bpf_timer_cancel(timer2); bpf_timer_cancel(timer1); Both bpf_timer_cancel calls would wait for the other callback to finish executing, introducing a lockup. Add an atomic_t count named 'cancelling' in bpf_hrtimer. This keeps track of all in-flight cancellation requests for a given BPF timer. Whenever cancelling a BPF timer, we must check if we have outstanding cancellation requests, and if so, we must fail the operation with an error (-EDEADLK) since cancellation is synchronous and waits for the callback to finish executing. This implies that we can enter a deadlock situation involving two or more timer callbacks executing in parallel and attempting to cancel one another. Note that we avoid incrementing the cancelling counter for the target timer (the one being cancelled) if bpf_timer_cancel is not invoked from a callback, to avoid spurious errors. The whole point of detecting cur->cancelling and returning -EDEADLK is to not enter a busy wait loop (which may or may not lead to a lockup). This does not apply in case the caller is in a non-callback context, the other side can continue to cancel as it sees fit without running into errors. Background on prior attempts: Earlier versions of this patch used a bool 'cancelling' bit and used the following pattern under timer->lock to publish cancellation status. lock(t->lock); t->cancelling = true; mb(); if (cur->cancelling) return -EDEADLK; unlock(t->lock); hrtimer_cancel(t->timer); t->cancelling = false; The store outside the critical section could overwrite a parallel requests t->cancelling assignment to true, to ensure the parallely executing callback observes its cancellation status. It would be necessary to clear this cancelling bit once hrtimer_cancel is done, but lack of serialization introduced races. Another option was explored where bpf_timer_start would clear the bit when (re)starting the timer under timer->lock. This would ensure serialized access to the cancelling bit, but may allow it to be cleared before in-flight hrtimer_cancel has finished executing, such that lockups can occur again. Thus, we choose an atomic counter to keep track of all outstanding cancellation requests and use it to prevent lockups in case callbacks attempt to cancel each other while executing in parallel.
Where it lives
The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.
kernel/bpf/helpers.c
- What this is
- BPF [GENERAL] (Safe Dynamic Programs and Tools)MAINTAINERS section matched on kernel/bpf/ · bpf@vger.kernel.org · Supported
Check it on the machine
grep -wE 'CONFIG_BPF|CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL' /boot/config-$(uname -r)Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.
Show whether Debian builds this, per release
Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.
- bookworm, trixie, forky, sidy
- y
- built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it
- Build switches
- CONFIG_BPF, CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
- Reads as
- all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.
From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages
Signals
- Published
- 2024-08-07 (2 years ago)source
- CVSS
- no vector published, unrated
- Attack vector
- not published
- EPSS
- 0.17%, higher than 5.4% of all CVEssource
- CISA KEV
- not listedthe KEV catalogue
- Debian urgency
- not yet assignedsource
- Subsystem
- kernel/bpf
Upstream fixes
The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source
| Introduced | Fixed in | Commit |
|---|---|---|
| 5.15 | 6.6.41 | 936983051868 |
| 5.15 | 6.9.10 | 3e4e8178a866 |
| 5.15 | 6.10 | d4523831f07a |
Why the CNA scored it this way
The kernel CNA published no CVSS vector and no reasoning for CVE-2024-42239, which is why it is shown as unrated rather than given an invented score. 6,405 of the 20,413 CVEs here carry reasoning; this is not one of them.