CVE-2023-52452

What the bug is

Privileged programs are supposed to be able to read uninitialized stack memory (ever since 6715df8d5) but, before this patch, these accesses were permitted inconsistently. In particular, accesses were permitted above state->allocated_stack, but not below it. In other words, if the stack was already "large enough", the access was permitted, but otherwise the access was rejected instead of being allowed to "grow the stack". This undesired rejection was happening in two places: - in check_stack_slot_within_bounds() - in check_stack_range_initialized() This patch arranges for these accesses to be permitted. A bunch of tests that were relying on the old rejection had to change; all of them were changed to add also run unprivileged, in which case the old behavior persists. One tests couldn't be updated - global_func16 - because it can't run unprivileged for other reasons. This patch also fixes the tracking of the stack size for variable-offset reads. This second fix is bundled in the same commit as the first one because they're inter-related. Before this patch, writes to the stack using registers containing a variable offset (as opposed to registers with fixed, known values) were not properly contributing to the function's needed stack size. As a result, it was possible for a program to verify, but then to attempt to read out-of-bounds data at runtime because a too small stack had been allocated for it. Each function tracks the size of the stack it needs in bpf_subprog_info.stack_depth, which is maintained by update_stack_depth(). For regular memory accesses, check_mem_access() was calling update_state_depth() but it was passing in only the fixed part of the offset register, ignoring the variable offset. This was incorrect; the minimum possible value of that register should be used instead. This tracking is now fixed by centralizing the tracking of stack size in grow_stack_state(), and by lifting the calls to grow_stack_state() to check_stack_access_within_bounds() as suggested by Andrii. The code is now simpler and more convincingly tracks the correct maximum stack size. check_stack_range_initialized() can now rely on enough stack having been allocated for the access; this helps with the fix for the first issue. A few tests were changed to also check the stack depth computation. The one that fails without this patch is verifier_var_off:stack_write_priv_vs_unpriv.

Where it lives

The fix touches these files. If the subsystem is one you do not use, the practical exposure is lower, though the package is still the vulnerable one.

kernel/bpf/verifier.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_global_func16.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_basic_stack.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_int_ptr.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_raw_stack.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_var_off.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/atomic_cmpxchg.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c

What this is

BPF [CORE]MAINTAINERS section matched on kernel/bpf/verifier.c · bpf@vger.kernel.org · Maintained

Check it on the machine

grep -wE 'CONFIG_BPF|CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL' /boot/config-$(uname -r)

Reads the booted kernel's own configuration, on the machine and nowhere else. =y is built in, =m is a module, and an is not set line means the code is not there.

Show whether Debian builds this, per release

Debian builds this code. Every release below compiles the affected file into the kernels it ships.

• bookworm, trixie, forky, sidy

y

built into the kernel image on every flavour - only a patch removes it

Build switches

CONFIG_BPF, CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL

Reads as

all on means the file is compiled; any one off means it is not.

From the configuration Debian publishes for every kernel flavour it builds. It covers only the architectures Debian ships a linux-config package for, and nothing about a kernel you built yourself. Debian's own status above stays authoritative about the source package.MAINTAINERS kbuild Makefiles Debian linux-config packages

Signals

Published

2024-02-22 (3 years ago)source

CVSS

no vector published, unrated

Attack vector

not published

EPSS

0.24%, higher than 13.9% of all CVEssource

CISA KEV

not listedthe KEV catalogue

Debian urgency

not yet assignedsource

Subsystem

kernel/bpf

Upstream fixes

The versions the CNA records as introducing and fixing this, and the commit for each. source

Introduced	Fixed in	Commit
5.12	6.6.14	0954982db828
5.12	6.7.2	fbcf372c8eda
5.12	6.8	6b4a64bafd10
5.10.33	0	0
5.11.17	0	0